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Chapter	Abstract:	Legislatures	are	a	cornerstone	of	representative	democracy.	Electoral	systems	
determine	 how	 votes	 are	 transformed	 into	 legislative	 seats.	 Because	 of	 this,	 what	 legislators	
must	do	to	win	re-elected	 is	shaped	by	electoral	 rules.	The	 impact	of	electoral	 incentives	goes	
beyond	 behavior,	 potentially	 shaping	 the	 rules	 and	 procedures	 of	 the	 legislature	 itself.	 This	
chapter	analyses	theories	and	evidence	which	link	legislative	organization	to	members’	electoral	
incentives.	 However,	 not	 all	 legislative	 structures	 have	 a	 clear	 electoral	 basis.	 As	 this	 chapter	
suggests,	the	relationship	between	electoral	systems	and	how	a	legislature	chooses	to	organize	
itself	is	a	conditional	one.	
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[T]he	organization	of	Congress	meets	remarkably	well	the	electoral	needs	
of	its	members.		To	put	it	another	way,	if	a	group	of	planners	sat	down	and	
tried	 to	 design	 a	 pair	 of	 American	 national	 assemblies	 with	 the	 goal	 of	
serving	members'	electoral	needs	year	in	and	year	out,	they	would	be	hard	
pressed	to	improve	on	what	exists	[Mayhew,	1974:	81-82]	
	
Legislatures	are	ubiquitous.	They	are	often	the	foundation	stone	of	democracy	at	the	local,	sub-
national,	national	and	even	supra-national	 level.	 In	all	democracies,	 legislatures	play	 important	
roles	 in	 law-making,	 executive	 oversight	 and	 representation	 of	 citizens’	 interests	 and	
preferences.	 In	 parliamentary	 regimes,	 the	 executive	 comes	 from	 the	 legislature.	 Legislatures	
can	even	play	significant	roles	in	authoritarian	regimes.	
	
This	 chapter	 is	 concerned	with	 legislative	organization	and	 in	particular	how	electoral	 systems	
shape	 legislative	 organization.	 Alemán	 (2015:	 145)	 helpfully	 defines	 legislative	 organization	 as	
“the	 set	of	procedures	 that	 regulate	 the	 legislative	process	and	 the	 related	 set	of	offices	with	
internal	 authority.”	 Legislatures	 vary	 significantly	 in	 how	 they	 are	 organized	 (Martin,	 Saalfeld,	
and	 Strøm	 2014).	 Variation	 may	 occur	 over	 time	 in	 the	 same	 legislature,	 when	 we	 compare	
different	 legislatures,	 or	when	we	 compare	 different	 chambers	 in	 a	multi-cameral	 legislature.	
Thus	the	British	Parliament	is	organized	very	differently	to	the	United	States	Congress,	which	is	
different	 in	 organization	 from	 many	 of	 the	 US	 State	 legislatures.	 The	 US	 House	 of	
Representatives	is	structurally	very	differently	to	the	US	Senate.	Virtually	all	 legislatures	update	
their	 organization	 at	 least	 occasionally.	 Scholars	 have	 been	 long	 intrigued	 by	 cross-sectional,	
inter-cameral	 and	 inter-temporal	 variation	 in	 the	 rules	 and	 procedures	 of	 legislatures	 (Zubek	
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2015;	Sieberer	et	al.	2016).	The	structure	and	significance	of	committees	has	been	a	core	focus	
for	those	interested	in	legislative	organization	(Martin	2014a).		
	
One	 possible	 explanation	 of	 legislative	 organization	 is	 the	 electoral	 system	 used	 to	 select	
legislators.	 By	 deciding	 how	 votes	 at	 an	 election	 are	 translated	 into	 seats	 in	 the	 legislature,	
electoral	systems	shape	what	politicians	must	do	in	order	to	get	elected	and	re-elected.	Decades	
of	 research	 on	 various	 legislatures	 suggests	 that	 legislators	 are	 electorally	 oriented	 in	 their	
behavior	(for	overviews	see	Zittel	and	Uslaner	2009,	André	et	al.	2016a,	and	André	and	Depauw,	
this	volume).	Yet	electoral	considerations	may	well	impact	far	more	than	behavior.	As	the	quote	
from	Mayhew	at	the	top	of	this	chapter	 illustrates,	how	a	 legislature	chooses	to	organize	 itself	
may	be	directly	impacted	by	members’	electoral	needs.	If	this	is	the	case,	we	should	be	able	to	
theoretically	 link	variation	 in	 legislative	organization	to	variation	 in	electoral	rules,	and	support	
this	supposition	with	some	empirical	evidence.	
	
Theoretically,	 candidate-centered	 electoral	 systems	 ought	 to	 result	 in	 centrifugal	 legislatures	
with	decentralized	organizational	structures.	In	contrast,	party-centered	electoral	systems	ought	
to	produce	centripetal	legislatures	with	power	concentrated	in	the	chamber	leadership	or	party	
leadership.	In	short,	whether	or	not	incumbents	need	to	cultivate	a	personal-vote	or	a	party-vote	
(Carey	 and	 Shugart	 1995)	 defines	 incumbents’	 interests	 and,	 by	 extension,	 should	 shape	
legislative	organization.		
	
3	
	
Understanding	 legislative	 organization	 is	 crucial	 because	 it	 allows	 uncovering	 the	 ‘black-box’	
between	electoral	systems	and	public	policy.	While	scholars	have	long	postulated	a	relationship	
between	electoral	systems	and	public	policy,	we	know	very	little	about	exactly	how	this	happens	
(Rickard	2012).	In	order	words,	we	may	know	the	rationale	for	why	electoral	rules	shape	policy	
outcomes	but	not	 the	 foundational	mechanism	by	which	political	elites	are	able	to	respond	to	
incentives.	 Legislative	organization	may	be	 the	mechanism	by	which	public	policy	 is	 shaped	 in	
responses	 to	members’	 electoral	 incentives.	 Indeed,	 the	 link	between	electoral	 incentives	 and	
policy	outputs	may	be	fragmented	by	particular	forms	of	legislative	organization.	Thus,	legislative	
organization	may	serve	to	facilitate	members’	preferences	or,	as	I	suggest	in	this	chapter,	it	may	
condition	 (weaken)	 the	 effect	 of	 electoral	 incentives	 by	 taking	 powers	 and	 policy	 perquisites	
away	from	individual	members.	
	
The	chapter	is	organized	as	follows:	Next,	I	review	theories	of	legislative	organization	which	link	
centrifugal	 force	 in	the	United	States	Congress	to	members’	electoral	goals.	 I	 then	review	how	
such	 theories	 have	 been	 applied	 to	 other	 legislative	 settings.	 In	 section	 three,	 I	 discuss	 the	
conditions	 under	 which	 legislative	 organization	 appears	 misaligned	 to	 members’	 electoral	
incentives.	I	conclude	the	chapter	with	suggestions	for	future	research.		
	
The	Electoral	Basis	of	Congressional	Organization	
Conventional	 wisdom	 suggests	 that	 members	 of	 the	 United	 States	 Congress	 are	 influenced	
heavily	by	electoral	considerations	(Mayhew	1974;	Fenno	1978).	Because	members	of	Congress	
need	 to	 build	 a	 personal	 reputation	 with	 constituents	 in	 order	 to	 aid	 re-election,	 district	
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preferences	 drive	 representative	 behavior	 (Miller	 and	 Stokes,	 1963).	 In	 addition,	 incumbents	
take	on	constituency	case-work	and	other	vote-winning	activities	in	their	district.	
	
Yet,	 electoral	 incentives	 shape	 not	 only	 preferences;	 electoral	 incentives	 may	 play	 a	 role	 in	
shaping	 the	 organizational	 structure	 of	 Congress	 itself.	 Specific	 attention	 has	 focused	 on	 the	
reason	 for	 committees’	 popularity	 as	 a	 form	 of	 legislative	 organizations	 in	 the	 United	 States	
Congress.	 Some	 of	 the	most	 compelling	 arguments	 for	 a	 link	 between	 electoral	 systems	 and	
legislators’	preferences	over	internal	legislative	structures,	as	distinct	from	behavior,	is	provided	
by	scholars	of	 the	United	States	Congress.	These	scholars	have	posited	a	relationship	between	
the	electoral	system	and	the	significance	of	committees	in	legislative	structures	within	Congress.	
More	 specifically,	 strong	 committees	 within	 Congress	 are	 associated	 with	 the	 candidate-
centered	 electoral	 environment	 and	 the	 related	 need	 for	members	 of	 Congress	 to	 cultivate	 a	
personal	 vote	 in	 order	 to	 secure	 re-election.	 Katz	 and	 Sala	 (1996)	 suggest	 that	 with	 the	
emergence	of	the	secret	ballot	and	the	resulting	need	for	incumbent	members	to	appeal	directly	
to	 voters,	 legislators	 looked	 to	 committees	 as	 a	 means	 of	 creating	 policy	 changes	 (and	
distributive	benefits)	for	which	they	could	claim	credit	in	their	home	districts.		In	explaining	the	
strength	of	committees	 in	Congress,	Shepsle	and	Weingast	 (1987)	explore	 the	role	of	a	strong	
committee	 system	 in	 meeting	 the	 electoral	 needs	 of	 members	 of	 Congress.	 They	 argue	 that	
strong	committees	exist	because,	in	the	parlance	of	electoral	studies	scholars,	committees	serve	
to	allow	members	to	cultivate	personal	votes.	Members	choose	to	organize	the	 legislature	not	
around	strong	parties	but	around	committees	with	strong	property	rights	that	allows	members	
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safeguard	 policy	 issues	 of	 most	 concern	 to	 their	 constituents	 and	 distribute	 particularistic	
spending	projects	to	their	districts.			
	
This	distributive	theory	gains	its	designation	from	the	suggestion	that	legislatures	are	organized	
around	 strong	 committees	 to	 allow	 members	 to	 distribute	 particularistic	 benefits	 to	 their	
constituents.	 Such	 benefits	 could	 include	 specific	 policies	 favored	 by	 voters	 in	 the	 member’s	
district	 or	 so	 called	 pork-barrel	 spending	 (fiscal	 legislative	 particularism),	 which	 refers	 to	 the	
practice	 of	 allocating	 for	 political	 reasons	 national	 tax	 revenues	 on	 economically	 inefficient,	
geographically	targeted,	projects.		
	
A	 number	 of	 assumptions	 underlie	 the	 distributive	 theory	 of	 legislative	 organizations.	 In	
particular,	legislators’	self-interest	and	motivations	from	the	goal	of	re-election	requires	building	
personal	 reputations	 with	 constituents	 by	 providing	 vote-winning	 pork-barrel	 projects	 and	
aligning	policy	concerns	with	voters’	salient	issues.	For	example,	rural	voters	may	favor	policies	
which	 promote	 agriculture,	 and	 in	 particular,	 assurance	 of	 continued	 flow	 of	 government	
subsidies	to	support	rural	communities.	To	be	re-elected,	incumbents	must	adopt	policies	most	
salient	to	their	constituents,	control	public	policy,	and	allocate	scare	resources	to	the	sector	that	
enhances	credentials	with	voters.	Yet,	in	a	plenary-centered	legislature	where	simple	majorities	
can	enact	changes	to	policy,	each	legislator	is	equal	in	ability	to	influence	all	proposals.	Thus,	to	
continue	our	example,	unless	representatives	from	rural	areas	control	a	majority	of	the	plenary,	
they	cannot	control	and	claim	credit	for	agricultural	policy.	Complicating	the	situations	is	that	the	
existence	 of	 multiple	 salient	 policy	 issues	 disallows	 the	 likelihood	 that	 any	 one	 interest	 can	
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maintain	 a	majority	 of	 the	 plenary.	 Social	 choice	 theory	 hypothesizes	 that	 political	 outcomes	
under	 such	 conditions,	 and	 assuming	 simple	 majority	 rules,	 are	 inherently	 unstable	 (Arrow	
1951).	 The	 classic	 divide-the-dollar	 game	 illustrates	 the	 problem:	 In	 this	 game,	 three	 players	
must	 agree	 to	 divide	 a	 dollar.	 Under	majority	 rules,	 any	 two	 can	 form	 a	winning	 coalition	 to	
agree	on	the	distribution	of	the	100	cents.	Player	A	and	Player	B	may	agree	to	divide	the	dollar	
equally	between	them,	leaving	Player	C	with	no	money,	thus	“maximizing”	the	utility	of	A	and	B.	
However,	 Player	 C	 may	 offer	 a	 counter-proposal,	 perhaps	 by	 offering	 Player	 A	 51	 cents	 and	
retaining	 49	 cents,	 thus	 denying	 Player	 B	 any	money	 and	 simultaneously	 improving	 Payer	 A’s	
position	 (by	 one	 cent).	 And	 so	 the	 game	 continues.	 No	 obvious	 result	 is	 available	 and	 any	
counter	decision	can	easily	negate	a	previous	one.	
	
The	divide-the-dollar	game	applies,	substantively,	to	any	legislative	setting	which	allocates	scarce	
resources	 (Baron	and	Ferejohn	1989).	Distribution	of	 funding	 in	pork-barrel	politics	 is	a	 classic	
example	 –	 legislators	must	 collectively	 agree	 on	 the	 amount	 each	member	 receives,	 but	 in	 a	
majority	setting,	any	decision	has	the	potential	for	alteration	by	a	counter	proposal,	just	as	in	the	
divide-the-dollar	game.	However,	cycling	can	occur	in	less	obvious	ways:	For	simplicity,	consider	
a	 House	 of	 Representatives	 divided	 three-ways	 based	 on	 members’	 and	 their	 constituents’	
preferences	for	policies.	The	focus	of	one	group	of	 incumbents	 is	domestic	manufacturing,	the	
second	 agriculture,	 and	 the	 third	 urban	 environment,	 with	 all	 three	 interests	 aiming	 for	
spending-sensitive	policy	changes.	This	situation	characterizes	a	sequential	game,	which	requires	
a	 coalition	 of	 two	 groups	 to	 institute	 change.	 The	 domestic	 manufacturing	 and	 agricultural	
interests	may	coalesce	with	the	agricultural	group	voting	for	the	manufacturing	group’s	interests	
7	
	
with	 the	 agreement	 that	 the	manufacturers	will	 subsequently	 support	 agricultural	 interests	 at	
another	 time.	 But	 once	 the	 manufacturing	 bill	 gains	 approval,	 the	 manufactures	 have	 no	
incentive	 not	 to	 renege	 on	 any	 promise	 made	 to	 their	 agricultural	 colleagues.	 Instead,	 the	
rational	 action	 for	 the	 manufacturers	 would	 be	 to	 seek	 to	 strike	 a	 new	 deal	 to	 secure	 an	
additional	 allocation	 of	 the	 remaining	 resources.	 Thus,	 cycling	 emerges,	with	 always	 changing	
coalitions	and	no	credible	ability	to	commit	to	logrolling	–	the	sequential	exchange	of	votes.	The	
game,	although	simple,	illustrates	what	social	choice	scholars	typically	refer	to	as	the	Condorcet	
cycle.	In	short,	absent	legislative	organization,	no	decision	is	stable.	
	
Shepsle	and	Weingast	(1987)	suggested	that	committees	exist	to	break	the	chaos	anticipated	by	
cycling	 by	 allowing	 for	 credible	 commitment	 in	 logrolling,	 thus	 permitting	members	 to	 secure	
vote-winning	 policies	 and	 spending	 for	 their	 constituents.	 If	 legislative	 chambers	 decide	 their	
internal	 organizations,	 the	 legislature	 can	 construct	 a	 system	 of	 committees	 to	 ensure	 that	
members	 with	 particular	 preferences	 for	 policies	 control	 those	 policy	 areas.	 Thus,	
representatives	of	agricultural	 interests	seek	establishment	of	an	agricultural	committee	which	
has	 control	 of	 policies	 and	 allocation	 of	 resources	 that	 concern	 the	 industry	 –	 effectively	
removing	decisions	 from	 the	plenary	and	providing	power	 to	members	who	have	 the	most	 to	
gain	or	 lose	 in	 that	 policy	 area.	 Committees	 are	 a	 form	of	 rules	 to	prevent	 the	breakdown	of	
cooperation	 among	 groups	 with	 different	 priorities	 over	 policy	 and	 spending	 (Weingast	 and	
Marshall	1988).		
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Such	 parsimonious,	 but	 nonetheless	 powerful,	 explanations	 of	 committees’	 distributive	 origin	
require	a	committee	system	to	have	four	characteristics:	First,	committees	must	have	the	ability	
to	 control	 the	 agenda	 and	 the	 outcome	 in	 the	 policy	 jurisdictions	 –	 commonly	 known	 as	
gatekeeping	 powers.	 The	 plenary,	 thus,	 must	 delegate	 significant	 authority	 to	 committees,	
making	 the	 relevant	 committee	 an	 agenda-setter	 or	 veto-player	 in	 the	 legislative	 process.	
Consequently,	any	change	in	agricultural	policy	must	require	support	of	the	relevant	agricultural	
committee.	 	 Second,	members	must	be	able	 to	 self-select	 into	preferred	committees	 (Shepsle	
1978).	 Third,	 and	 relatedly,	 committees	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 composed	of	 ‘policy-outliers’	 (Shepsle	
and	Weingast	1987).	In	other	words,	committees	should	not	be	representative	of	the	plenary	(or	
the	 plenary	 median)	 but	 should	 include	 members	 with	 extreme	 preferences	 toward	 the	
committee’s	jurisdiction.	Thus,	to	continue	the	example,	an	agricultural	committee	would	consist	
of	members	 strongly	 interested	 in,	 and	 committed	 to,	 that	 industry.	 As	 such,	 the	 committee	
would	be	 ‘unrepresentative’	of	 the	chamber.	Fourth,	committee	membership	should	associate	
with	policy	or	financial	rewards	for	a	member’s	district.		
	
The	 suggestion	 of	 committees	 as	 institutional	 solutions	 to	 drive	 geographically-focused	
particularistic	distribution,	and	thus	incumbents’	re-elections,	has	had	a	profound	effect	on	the	
study	 of	 social	 choice	 theory	 and	 American	 political	 institutions.	 Yet,	 the	 idea	 that	 electoral	
incentives	drive	 the	organization	of	Congress	 is	not	without	 its	 critics.	 For	example,	Berry	 and	
Fowler	 (2016)	 question	 the	 causal	 link	 between	 committee	 assignments	 and	 pork-barrel	
spending,	 instead	 finding	 that	seats	on	key	committees	produce	 little	additional	 spending.	The	
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proposition	that	committee	membership	fails	to	provide	mechanisms	for	vote	winning	provides	
a	fundamental	challenge	to	the	distributive	theory	of	legislative	organization.		
	
The	distributive	perspective	has	also	been	questioned	on	theoretical	grounds.	The	informational	
theory	 of	 legislative	 organization	 proposed	 by	 Gilligan	 and	 Krehbiel	 (1987)	 challenges	 the	
electoral-based	 distributive	 theory,	 suggesting	 instead	 that	 the	 legislature	 is	 structured	 to	
maximizes	members’	acquisition	and	sharing	of	information	(Gilligan	and	Krehbiel	1987;	Gilligan	
and	 Krehbiel	 1990;	 Krehbiel	 1991).	 From	 this	 perspective,	 the	 organization	 of	 the	 legislature	
around	 strong	 committees	 allows	 member	 specialization.	 These	 gains	 from	 specialization	
facilitate	 informational	 advantages	 and	 tacit	 knowledge	 accumulation,	 resulting	 in	 better	
legislative	activities	of	benefit	to	the	entire	chamber.	 In	the	distributive	perspective,	member’s	
incentives	 revolve	 around	 delivering	 distributive	 benefits	 which	 aid	 re-election.	 In	 contrast,	
committees	from	the	informational	perspective	provide	a	collective,	but	little	individual,	benefit.		
	
Cox	 and	 McCubbins	 (1993)	 acknowledged	 that	 much	 of	 the	 observable	 work	 of	 Congress	 is	
undertaken	 within	 and	 between	 committees	 but	 suggested	 that	 political	 parties	 nevertheless	
play	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	 legislative	 organization.	 For	 Cox	 and	 McCubbins,	 the	 structuring	 of	 the	
system	 by	 political	 parties	 assists	 the	 party’s	 leadership	 by	 cartelizing	 legislative	 power.	 The	
committee	system,	far	from	being	the	focal	point	of	power,	allows	parties	to	control	members.	
In	this	partisan	cartel	model	of	legislative	organization,	committees	are	not	the	dominant	source	
of	influence	and	authority	which	traditional	accounts	of	congressional	organization	suggest.		
	
10	
	
Similar	 to	 the	 empirical	 investigation	 of	 earlier	 theories	 of	 legislative	 organization,	 Cox	 and	
McCubbins	 (1993)	 focus	 on	 the	 assignment	 (and	 reassignment)	 process	 –	 the	 rules	 by	 which	
members	 gain	 appointment	 to	 specific	 committees.	 The	party	 leadership,	 Cox	 and	McCubbins	
suggest,	 play	 a	 far	 more	 significant	 role	 in	 the	 assignment	 process	 than	 previously	
acknowledged.	The	analysis	of	assignments	to	committees,	between	1947	and	1988,	undermines	
the	assumption	that	committees	consist	of	policy	outliers.	Evidence	suggests	 the	party	 leaders	
cartelize	 the	 allocation	 of	 assignments	 and	 use	 the	 assignments	 strategically	 to	 reward	 loyal	
partisans	and	punish	members	who	have	defied	 the	 leadership	during	 roll-call	 votes.	A	 similar	
pattern	of	control	emerges	when	exploring	requests	for	switched	assignments	(reassignment	of	
committee	 membership).	 In	 short,	 the	 suggestion	 is	 that	 the	 focus	 on	 committees	 as	 an	
important	unit	within	Congress	obscures	 the	 fact	 that	party	 leaders	control	who	sits	on	which	
committee.	This	control	shapes	not	only	the	composition	of	committees,	and	by	extension	the	
nature	of	 the	committee,	but	also	the	power	the	party	 leadership	wields,	 to	enforce	the	party	
discipline.		
	
While	the	distributive	theory	of	legislative	organization	focused	on	individual	member’s	electoral	
interests,	 such	 electoral-origin	 theories	 of	 congressional	 organization	 are	 no	 longer	 taken	 for	
granted	in	the	Congressional	literature.	The	centripetal	force	of	the	party	leadership	may	serve	
to	reduce	the	ability	of	members	 to	use	committees	 to	win	votes.	At	 the	same	time,	both	the	
House	of	Representatives	and	the	Senate	 likely	enjoy	some	of	the	highest	 incumbency	rates	of	
any	 democratic	 legislature	 operating	 today	 –	 suggesting	 that	 the	 perquisites	 of	 Congressional	
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office,	 dispensed	 by	 legislative	 organization,	 greatly	 aid	 incumbents	 in	 holding	 their	 seats	 at	
election	time.	
	
Comparative	Perspectives	
Given	the	inconclusive	nature	of	the	debate	among	Congressional	scholars	on	the	link	between	
electoral	 incentives	 and	 congressional	 organization,	 it	 is	 worth	 exploring	 the	 geographical	
generalizability	 of	 the	 distributive	 theory.	 Cross-national	 variation	 in	 election	 systems	 should	
provide	an	opportunity	 to	 test,	 comparatively,	 any	 connection	between	 institutionally-induced	
electoral	incentives	and	legislative	organization.	A	testable	implication	of	the	distributive	theory	
of	 congressional	 organization	 is	 that	 candidate-centered	 electoral	 systems	 should	 result	 in	
legislatures	 with	 strong	 committees.	 Figure	 1	 depicts	 this	 view	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	
personal	 vote	 electoral	 systems	 and	 committee	 structures	 (Martin	 2011).	 As	 the	 incentive	 to	
cultivate	 the	 personal	 vote	 increases,	 so	 too	 should	 the	 strength	 of	 committees	 in	 the	
legislature.	 The	 rationale	 is	 simple:	 In	 candidate-centered	 electoral	 systems,	 the	 legislature	 is	
organized	 in	 such	 a	 way	 as	 to	 privilege	 individual	 incumbent	members	 to	 win	 votes	 via	 their	
legislative	 activity.	 These	 centrifugal	 pressures	 result	 in	 a	 strong	 committee	 system,	 allowing	
incumbents	 control	 policy	 of	 most	 interest	 to	 their	 constituents	 and	 distribute	 particularistic	
benefits.	Indeed,	Powell	(2000,	34)	noted	the	empirical	correlation	between	strong	committees	
and	proportionally	representative	electoral	systems.	In	contrast,	where	members	are	dependent	
on	 their	 party	 for	 re-election,	 the	 legislature	 will	 also	 be	 party-centered.	 For	 example,	 in	 a	
seminal	contribution,	Cox	(1987)	suggests	that	electoral	reform	in	Britain	resulted	in	procedural	
changes	 in	 the	House	 of	 Commons.	 Specifically,	 less	 candidate-centered	 voting	may	 associate	
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with	 greater	 cabinet	 control	 of	 the	 legislative	 agenda	 and	 deterioration	 of	 individual	 MPs	
parliamentary	prerogatives	and	rights.		
	
<Figure	1	around	here>	
Despite	 the	 logic	 and	 pellucidity	 of	 the	 argument	 linking	 legislative	 organization	 to	 electoral	
politics,	 not	 all	 candidate-centered	 electoral	 systems	 produce	 legislatures	 with	 strong	
committees.	 Looking	 at	 55	 legislatures,	 Taylor	 (2006)	 finds	 some	 evidence	 that	 personal	 vote	
electoral	 systems	 associate	 with	 decentralized	 legislative	 procedures	 (procedures	 which	 give	
power	to	rank-and-file	members	rather	than	concentrate	power	in	the	leadership).	Yet	the	best	
predictor	 of	 the	 legislative	 procedures	 is	 chamber	 size	 and	 bicameral	 power:	 legislative	
procedures	are	most	decentralized	 in	 small	 chambers	and	 the	powerful	 chamber	 in	bicameral	
systems	 (Taylor	 2006),	 suggesting	 that	 electoral	 incentives	may	 not	 be	what	 drives	 legislative	
organization.	Martin	(2011)	finds	no	relationship	between	a	legislature's	committee	system	and	
the	incentive	to	cultivate	personal	votes	generated	by	the	electoral	system.		
	
While	 candidate-centered	 electioneering	 produces	 strong	 committees	 in	 the	 United	 States,	
other	 candidate-centered	 systems,	 with	 the	 same	 or	 even	 stronger	 incentives	 to	 cultivate	 a	
personal	vote,	produces	weak	legislative	committees	in	other	countries.	For	example,	under	the	
Single	Transferable	Vote	electoral	system,	Irish	legislators	face	significant	incentives	to	cultivate	
personal	 votes,	 not	 least	 because	 they	must	 compete	with	 co-partisans	 for	 the	 same	 seats	 in	
parliament.	Yet,	the	 Irish	parliament	has	a	 long	tradition	of	weak	committees	(André,	Depauw,	
and	Martin	2016).	Arguments	that	this	difference	is	due	to	the	presidential	nature	of	American	
13	
	
government	and	 the	parliamentary	nature	of	other	 regimes	become	 less	 compelling	when	we	
observe	 strong	 committees	 operating	within	 parliamentary	 regimes	 and	more	 generally	when	
significant	 variation	 in	 committee	 system	 structures	 across	 legislatures	 operating	 under	
parliamentarism	is	detected	(Mattson	and	Strøm	1995;	Martin	2011).		
	
Because	an	analysis	of	appointments	 to	committees	 forms	the	backbone	of	empirical	 research	
on	 Congressional	 committees,	 scholars	 have	 also	 explored	 committee	 assignment	 patterns	 in	
other	regimes	to	detect	explanations	of	legislative	organization.	For	example,	Crisp	et	al.	(2009)	
explore	patterns	of	assignment	to	committees	in	Argentina,	Costa	Rica,	and	Venezuela.	They	find	
that	procedures	for	selection	of	candidates	and	electoral	rules	contribute	to	explaining	some	but	
not	most	of	the	variation	in	patterns	of	assignments	among	national	cases	and	individual	careers.	
Raymond	and	Holt	 (2014)	 find	 that	distributive	and	partisan	models	of	 legislative	organization	
explain	 committee	 assignments	 in	 Canada.	 Research	 on	 the	 European	 Parliament	 noted	 that	
committee	 assignments	 tend	 to	be	proportionate	 to	 the	party’s	 plenary	 size,	 and	parties	 thus	
influence	and	shaped	the	composition	of	committees	(Bowler	and	Farrell	1995;	McElroy	2006)	–	
suggesting	 evidence	 favoring	 the	 party-cartel	 perspective.	 In	 contrast,	 (Whitaker	 2001;	 2011)	
noted	that	members	are	typically	able	to	self-select	assignments,	based	on	members’	own	policy	
interests	–	suggesting	evidence	in	favor	of	the	informational	perspective.	Yordanova	(2009)	finds	
little	 evidence	 to	 support	 the	 partisan	 theory	 but	 noted	 that	 committees	 with	 distributive	
potential	 tend	 to	 consist	 of	 “high-demanding”	 preferential	 outliers	 –	 suggesting	 evidence	 in	
favor	of	the	distributive	explanation.	In	contrast,	committees	with	no	distributive	authority	tend	
to	 attract	 members	 with	 relevant	 expertise	 but	 no	 special	 interests	 –	 suggesting	 evidence	 in	
14	
	
favor	of	the	informational	perspective.	As	with	the	US	Congress,	research	on	committees	in	the	
EP	 currently	 brings	 us	 no	 closer	 to	 agreeing	 on	 a	 theory	 of	 legislative	 organization	 linking	
electoral	considerations	to	members’	attitude	to	committees	(as	measured	through	committee	
assignments).	 Ciftci,	 Forrest	 and	 Tekin	 (2008)	 explore	 the	 Turkish	 case,	 finding	 evidence	 that	
policy	 interests	 and	 seniority	 are	 influential,	 interpreted	 as	 evidence	 for	 both	 distributive	 and	
informational	theories.	The	Danish	case	suggests	assignments	processes	differ	within	the	same	
chamber	 by	 party,	 leading	 Hansen	 (2010)	 to	 speculate	 that	 the	 entire	 process	 is	 potentially	
random.	Looking	at	the	German	case,	Gschwend	and	Zittel	(2016)	find	that	legislators	with	local	
ties	are	more	likely	to	be	assigned	to	committees	that	deliver	pork	to	please	local	constituents.	
But	 the	 mode	 of	 election	 (single	 member	 district	 versus	 party	 list	 –	 Germany	 has	 a	 mixed-
member	electoral	system)	does	not	influence	committee	assignments.			
	
We	are	left	with	something	of	a	puzzle:	In	some	cases,	legislative	organization	can	be	traced	to	
members’	electoral	 incentives.	 In	other	 instances,	the	link	between	legislative	organization	and	
the	electoral	 system	used	 to	elect	 legislators	 is	undetectable.	Below	 I	examine	 features	of	 the	
political	system	which	may	condition	or	even	break	the	relationship	between	electoral	interests	
and	legislative	organization.		
	
Conditioning	the	Electoral	Effect	
To	 understand	 the	 relationship	 between	 electoral	 systems	 and	 legislative	 organization,	 it	 is	
necessary	 to	 recognize	 the	 consequences	 of	 what	 I	 call	 different	mechanisms	 to	 cultivate	 a	
personal	vote	(MCPV).	Legislators	who	need	to	cultivate	personal	votes	have	access	to	different	
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MCPVs,	with	the	exact	nature	of	these	vote-gathering	mechanisms	varying	from	polity	to	polity.	
Differences	in	how	legislators	cultivate	votes	ultimately	determines	legislators’	preferences	over	
internal	legislative	structures.	
	
To	understand	how	MCPV	may	differ	from	polity	to	polity,	it	is	worth	contrasting	how	legislators	
in	 the	 United	 States	 and	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 cultivate	 personal	 votes.	 In	 the	 United	 States,	
incumbents	 rely	 on	 a	 number	 of	mechanisms:	 these	 include	pork	 barrel	 projects,	 undertaking	
casework	for	individual	constituents	or	groups	within	the	district	and	a	range	of	other	activities,	
such	 as	 arranging	 tours	 of	 federal	 buildings,	 nominating	 Congressional	 interns	 and	 attending	
public	meetings	and	other	events	 in	 their	district.	 In	 the	United	Kingdom,	parliamentarians	do	
not	typically	secure	or	seek	to	secure	pork-barrel	projects	for	their	district.	Instead,	British	MPs	
devote	 considerable	 time	 to	 extra-legislative	 constituency	 service,	 which,	 according	 to	 Norris	
(1997),	 has	 four	 components:	 dealing	 with	 constituency	 casework,	 holding	 meetings	 or	
‘surgeries’	 with	 individual	 constituents,	 attending	 local	 party	 meetings,	 and	 attending	 other	
functions	 in	 their	 constituency.	 Notably	 absent	 from	 this	 list	 is	 work	 to	 secure	 pork	 spending	
projects	 for	 their	 district.	Where	 the	 executive	 has	 budgetary	 authority	 and	 the	 sole	 right	 to	
introduce	what	are	often	referred	to	as	money	bills	(bills	with	a	spending	element)	 it	becomes	
impractical	for	individual	legislators	to	cultivate	personal	votes	by	means	of	fiscal	particularism.	
As	 others	 have	demonstrated,	 British	MPs,	 like	 legislators	 in	many	 countries,	 have	no	or	 little	
opportunity	to	generate	fiscal	particularism	for	their	districts	(Cain,	Ferejohn	and	Fiorina	1997).	
As	a	result,	British	MPs	rely	on	mostly	extra-legislative	mechanisms	to	enhance	their	reputation	
with	constituents.	
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Existing	 research	 on	 electoral	 systems	 and	 legislative	 organization	 has	 tended	 to	 treat	 all	
personal	vote	gathering	strategies	as	being	the	same	in	terms	of	consequence.	Here,	not	only	do	
we	 draw	 attention	 to	 the	 obvious	 differences	 between	 legislative	 particularism	 and	 extra-
legislative	parochialism	(service	to	a	district	or	constituent	that	 is	not	based	on	securing	public	
spending	 projects)	 but	 highlight	 the	 need	 to	 explore	 the	 consequences	 of	 different	 MCPVs,	
particularly	as	it	applies	to	members’	preferences	over	internal	legislative	organization.	
	
Legislators	 elected	 under	 candidate-centered	 ballot	 structures	 are	 obligated	 by	 virtue	 of	 the	
electoral	 system	 to	 focus	 on	 cultivating	 personal	 votes,	 but	 the	 vote	 cultivating	 mechanism	
ultimately	determines	how	the	 legislature	will	be	organized.	To	clarify,	 let	us	 think	deductively	
about	two	different	legislative	settings,	the	first	where	individual	legislators	can	target	spending	
to	their	geographical	districts	and	a	second	scenario	where	budgetary	rules	and	the	executive-
legislative	 relationship	make	 it	 impossible	 or	 unlikely	 that	 individual	 legislators	will	 be	 able	 to	
impact	spending	plans.	 In	 the	 first,	we	would	expect	 legislators	 to	cultivate	a	personal	vote	by	
securing	particularistic	spending;	in	the	second	we	would	expect	the	members	to	be	focused	on	
providing	alternative,	non-fiscal,	benefits	to	constituents.	Where	individual	legislators	can	target	
particularistic	 benefit	 to	 their	 constituents,	 there	 is	 every	 reason	 to	 expect	 the	 logic	 of	 the	
distributive	theory	of	 legislative	organization	to	hold.	Where	committees	provide	opportunities	
for	 reputation-building	 with	 constituents,	 and	 the	 electoral	 system	 is	 candidate-centered,	
legislators	 will	 have	 an	 incentive	 to	 participate	 in	 committee	 work.	 To	 ultimately	 ensure	 an	
incumbency	 advantage,	 legislators	will	 organize	 a	 strong	 committee	 system	where	 legislators’	
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property	 and	 distributive	 rights	 can	 be	 used	 to	 ingratiate	 them	 with	 their	 geographical	
constituency.	 The	 key	 point	 here,	 à	 la	 Shepsle	 and	Weingast	 (1987),	 is	 that	 the	 relationship	
between	 cultivating	 personal	 votes	 and	 strong	 committees	 holds	 because	 individual	members	
can	use	committees	to	enhance	their	personal	vote.	
	
Absent	 the	 opportunity	 for	 gaining	 credit	 ‘back	 home’	 for	 legislative	 particularism,	 individual	
legislators	will	 think	more	carefully	about	allocating	 their	 limited	 time	and	scarce	 resources	 to	
committee	work,	especially	given	that	extra-legislative	activity	are	more	 likely	to	enhance	their	
opportunities	for	re-election.	Focusing	on	constituency	service	leaves	little	time	for	legislators	to	
perform	 non-parochial	 legislative	 roles	 such	 as	 active	 involvement	 in	 committee	 work.	
Frequently,	legislative	committees	perform	the	role	of	assessing	proposed	legislation	and	holding	
the	 executive	 to	 account.	 In	 many	 legislative	 settings,	 committee	 work	 relates	 to	 issues	 of	
national	 policy	 which	 provides	 little	 opportunity	 for	 individual	 legislators	 to	 differentiate	
themselves	 in	 terms	 of	 constituent-interests	 and	 build	 personal	 reputations	 with	 individual	
constituents.	A	strong	committee	system	may	be	electorally	costly	to	a	member	who	would	be	
better	 served,	 in	 terms	of	enhancing	 their	personal	vote,	 focusing	on	 local	politics	outside	 the	
legislature.	In	political	systems	where	the	MCPV	is	non-legislative	and	therefore	more	reliant	on	
brokerage	 or	 other	 forms	 of	 direct	 voter	 contact,	 members	 have	 little	 incentive	 to	 sit	 on	
committees.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 committee	 work	 could	 actively	 interfere	 with	 personal	 vote	
gathering	 activities	 such	 as	 spending	 time	 in	 the	 constituency,	 meeting	 constituents	 or	
undertaking	 constituency	 casework.	 Ultimately,	 where	 the	 design	 of	 committee	 systems	 is	
determined	 by	 the	 legislature	 itself,	 and	 where	 exogenous	 rules	 mandate	 that	 committees	
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provide	 no	 avenue	 for	 particularistic	 spending	 credit-taking,	 we	 would	 not	 expect	 to	 see	 the	
emergence	of	strong	committees.1	Seeing	no	electoral	benefit	to	committee	work,	members	will	
shy	 away	 from	having	 strong	 committees	 to	which	 they	would	 be	 expected	 to	 dedicate	 time,	
effort	and	other	scarce	resources.		
	
This	 conditional	 perspective	 on	 legislative	 organization	 is	 displayed	 in	 Figure	 2	 and	 can	 be	
contrasted	 with	 the	 conventional	 perspective,	 as	 shown	 in	 Figure	 1	 above.	 In	 Figure	 2,	 the	
relationship	 between	 ballot	 structure	 and	 committee	 system	 is	 conditional	 on	 the	 MCPV.	 In	
essence,	ballot	 structure	 interacts	with	MPCV	to	determine	 the	shape	of	 legislative	structures.	
Where	 the	MPCV	 is	 fiscal	 particularism,	 or	 where	 fiscal	 particularism	 is	 an	 important	 tool	 to	
cultivate	 personal	 votes,	 and	 the	 electoral	 system	 is	 candidate-centered,	we	 should	 expect	 to	
find	 strong	 committees.	 Indeed,	 as	 I	 have	 demonstrated	 elsewhere	 (Martin	 2011),	 committee	
systems	tend	to	be	stronger,	 the	more	significant	 the	personal	vote,	but	only	 if	 legislators	can	
use	committee	assignments	to	further	geographically-targeted	legislative	particularism.		
	
<Figure	2	around	here>	
                                                
1	 Research	 on	 legislative	 rules	 and	 executive-legislative	 rules	 highlights	 the	 presence	 of	 a	
constitutional	or	higher-law	provision	stipulating	exclusive	executive	authority	over	fiscal	matters	
in	 many	 countries	 (Wehner	 2010).	 Given	 the	 number	 of	 veto-players	 needed	 to	 change	
constitutional/higher-law	 provisions,	 it	 seems	 fair	 to	 assume	 that,	 in	 most	 cases	 at	 least,	
individual	 legislators	have	 little	or	no	control	over	whether	or	not	 the	political	 system	permits	
legislative	particularism.	
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Other	 features	 of	 a	 political	 system	 may	 also	 break	 or	 weaken	 the	 link	 between	 members’	
electoral	 incentives	 and	how	 the	 legislature	 is	 organized.	 For	 example,	 virtually	 all	 legislatures	
endow	certain	members	with	extra	authority	and	responsibilities	 (Cox	2006;	Smith	and	Martin	
2017).	 Researchers	 have	 been	 largely	 silent	 on	 the	 impact	 of	 “Chapter	 2”	 (the	 allocation	 of	
mega-seats	 such	 as	 cabinet	 seats	 among	 legislators)	 on	 legislative	 behavior	 and	 organization.	
Allocation	of	mega-seats	occurs	by	a	variety	of	means.	Party	leader-centered	allocation	of	mega-
seats	 induces	 loyalty	 to	 the	 party	 leadership	 (as	 with	 party-centered	 electoral	 systems).	 In	
contrast,	 if	the	party	leadership	has	no	control	over	re-election	(a	candidate	centered	electoral	
system)	or	over	the	allocation	of	mega-seats	(a	seniority-based	system)	individual	legislators	are	
free	 to	 act	 within	 the	 legislative	 arena	 without	 the	 need	 to	 act	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	
preferences	 of	 their	 party	 leaders.	 What	 happens	 when	 incentives	 to	 cultivate	 mega-seats	
diverges	from	incentives	to	cultivate	personal	votes?		Figure	3	presents	the	likely	consequences	
of	this	for	one	of	the	most	observed	and	researched	aspects	of	legislator	behavior	–	the	degree	
to	which	 legislators	 from	 the	 same	party	 vote	 the	 same	way	on	 floor	 votes.	 	 Two	of	 the	 four	
typologies	provide	 clean-cut	predictions	 for	 the	 level	of	unified	party	 voting:	Mega-seats	 filled	
through	seniority,	or	 those	more	generally	 free	of	 the	 involvement	of	party	 leaders,	combined	
with	a	candidate-centered	electoral	 system	should	 result	 in	a	decentralized.	Party	voting	unity	
should	only	occur	when	parties	are	 ideologically	 cohesive	–	otherwise	 individual	members	will	
roll-call	on	the	basis	of	their	own	preferences	or	the	preferences	of	their	constituents,	with	little	
regard	for	the	wishes	of	the	party	leadership.	The	leadership	can	neither	give	nor	remove	much	
that	 the	 individual	 legislator	 values.	 Empirically,	 the	U.S.	 Congress,	 perhaps,	 approaches	most	
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closely	 a	 reflection	 of	 this	 situation	 –	 the	 party	 leadership	 has	 little	 control	 over	 selection,	
election,	and	mega-seat	allocation.		
	
<Figure	3	around	here>	
	
The	 example	 of	 the	 Irish	 case	 provides	 a	 hard-test	 of	 the	 argument	 that	 mega-seats	 are	 of	
significance	 to	 how	 members	 behave	 within	 the	 legislative	 arena,	 and	 by	 extension	 their	
preferences	over	 legislative	organization.	 Irish	 legislators	face	competing	principals:	 In	order	to	
gain	 re-election,	 incumbents	 must	 cultivate	 personal	 votes-	 the	 STV	 electoral	 system	 is	
considered	 the	most	 candidate-centered	 electoral	 system	 used	 to	 elect	 a	 national	 legislature	
(André,	 Depauw,	 and	Martin	 2016b).	 Yet	 the	 Irish	 parliament	 is	 dominated	 by	 party	 leaders.	
Members	 have	 accepted	 highly	 centripetal	 legislative	 structures	 despite	 a	 personal-vote	
electoral	environment.	What	explains	such	centralized	legislative	structures	in	the	presence	of	a	
highly	 candidate-centered	electoral	environment?	A	possible	explanation	 is	 the	ability	of	party	
leaders	 to	 control	 promotion	 opportunities	 from	 the	 backbenches	 to	 the	 frontbench	 (Martin	
2014b).	A	 real	motivation	 for	 incumbents	 is	promotion	 to	ministerial	office.	Thus,	promotional	
prospects	may	be	more	important	for	influencing	legislators’	interests	than	what	goes	on	at	the	
ballot	 box.	 The	 Irish	 case	 arguably	 demonstrates	 that	 electoral	 interests	 do	 not	 necessarily	
translate	 into	particular	 forms	of	 legislative	 behavior	 or	 organization.	Other	 political	 rules	 and	
institutions	can	condition	this	relationship.	Thus	personal	vote	electoral	systems	do	not	always	
give	rise	to	decentralized	legislatures,	as	the	US	case	(and	literature)	would	have	us	believe.		
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Conclusion	
Scholars	 have	 long	 been	 intrigued	 by	 the	 rules	 governing	 how	 legislators	 are	 elected.	 This	 is	
understandable,	 not	 least	 given	 the	 central	 role	 played	 by	 legislators	 and	 legislatures	 in	most	
political	systems.	For	similar	reasons,	scholars	have	expended	considerable	effort	to	explore	how	
legislatures	work	and	how	they	are	organized.	Indeed,	intertemporal	and	cross-polity	variation	in	
how	 different	 legislative	 chambers	 organize	 themselves	 remains	 a	 central	 puzzle	 in	 legislative	
studies.	In	contrast,	other	organizations	such	as	business	firms	tend	to	have	far	greater	levels	of	
similarity	in	how	they	organize,	over	time	and	across	different	countries.	
	
Despite	all	 that	has	been	written	about	 legislative	organization,	much	remains	to	be	done,	not	
least	 in	understanding	better	why	some	 legislatures	appear	 relatively	better	designed	 to	meet	
the	re-election	needs	of	members.	I	conclude	with	some	suggestions	for	future	research.		
	
As	 central	 as	 committee	 systems	 are	 to	 legislative	 organization,	 other	 rules	 and	 procedures	
greatly	 impact	how	a	 legislature	operates.	Scholars	need	to	explore	 these	other	organizational	
attributes,	 and	 whether	 electoral	 incentives	 explain	 organizational	 features	 other	 than	
committee	 systems.	 For	example,	 are	 resources	 such	as	 research	and	political	 staff	within	 the	
legislature	more	 likely	 to	 be	 employed	 by	 and	 for	 individual	 members	 in	 candidate	 centered	
systems?	 In	 some	 legislatures,	 such	 resources	 are	 controlled	 and	 directed	 centrally;	 in	 other	
cases,	 staff	 associate	with	 individual	members.	 Similarly,	 is	 agenda	 setting	and	agenda	 control	
prerogatives	 more	 likely	 to	 be	 controlled	 by	 the	 party	 leadership	 in	 legislatures	 with	 party-
centered	 electoral	 environments,	 as	 Cox	 (1987)	 hints	 at?	 While	 scholars	 have	 long	 studied	
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legislators	voting	(roll-call)	behavior	(Carey	2009;	Depauw	and	Martin	2009),	do	the	rules	which	
govern	floor	votes	associate	with	the	electoral	system	used	to	elect	members?	Hug,	Wegmann	
and	Wüest	(2015),	for	example,	suggest	that	the	transparency	of	the	voting	procedures	is	related	
to	candidate	selection	rules.	Thus,	an	entire	world	of	legislative	organization	beyond	committees	
remains	to	be	explored	in	greater	detail.	
	
Second,	and	relatedly,	the	task	of	explaining	legislative	organization	is	complicated	by	lack	of	co-
variation	 in	 various	 parts	 of	 the	 legislative	 structure.	 While	 this	 chapter	 has	 talked	 of	
decentralized	and	centralized	forms	of	legislative	organization,	different	organizational	features	
within	the	same	 legislature	can	pull	power	and	 influence	 in	different	ways	within	a	 legislature.	
For	 example,	 Cheibub,	 Martin,	 and	 Rasch	 (2015)	 find	 that	 legislatures	 tend	 to	 have	 a	 more	
significant	formal	role	in	selecting	the	executive	(in	parliamentary	systems)	when	the	executive	
enjoys	stronger	agenda	control	powers.	Thus,	it	may	be	inappropriate	to	look	at	any	one	feature	
of	legislative	organization	and	relate	this	to	electoral	politics.	What	is	needed	is	a	more	nuanced	
measure	 of	 centralization	 and	 decentralization	 in	 legislative	 organization.	 Only	 then	 can	 we	
understand	 the	 electoral	 systems	 act	 as	 a	 centripetal	 or	 centrifugal	 force	 on	 legislative	
structures.		
	
Third,	 we	 need	 to	 understand	 the	 historical	 foundations	 of	 legislative	 organization	 –	 in	 other	
words	how	do	legislative	structures	come	about	and	how	do	they	change?	Who	are	the	actors	
designing	 legislative	 structures	 and	 what	 are	 the	 actual	 processes	 by	 which	 legislatures	 are	
organized	 and	 reorganized?	 Existing	 research	 has	 tended	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 motivations	 for	
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institutional	 design	 among	 incumbent	 legislators.	 The	 evolution	 of	 organization	 may	 involve	
more	players	than	the	legislators	in	that	chamber	-	Sin	(2014)	finds	that	changes	to	the	rules	by	
the	US	House	of	Representatives	reflects	the	bargaining	context	between	the	House,	the	Senate	
and	the	President.	
	
Finally,	 scholars	 should	 leverage	 change	 in	 electoral	 institutions	 and	 change	 in	 legislative	
organization	 to	 better	 identify	 the	 causal	 mechanisms	 underlying	 change.	 When	 a	 country	
changes	its	electoral	system,	do	we	see	change	to	how	the	legislature	is	organized?	If	so,	can	we	
relate	change	in	legislative	organization	to	change	in	the	electoral	system?	This	may	be	a	difficult	
task.	 For	 example,	 shifting	 to	 a	 more	 proportional	 system	 may	 be	 associated	 with	 a	
decentralization	of	power	in	the	legislature	but	this	decentralization	of	power	may	arise	from	a	
change	 to	 the	 form	of	 government	 rather	 than	 the	electoral	 incentives	of	 incumbents.	André,	
Depauw,	 and	 Martin	 (2016b)	 suggest	 that	 the	 shift	 from	 single	 party	 cabinets	 to	 coalition	
cabinets	motivated	a	 strengthening	of	 the	 committee	 systems	 in	 the	 Irish	parliament.	A	more	
fragmented	party	system	and	resultant	need	to	build	a	coalition,	as	distinct	from	single	party	-	
government	may	 be	 the	 real	 cause	 of	 legislative	 re-organization	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 electoral	
system	change.		
	
As	 this	 chapter	 has	 demonstrated,	 legislators’	 electoral	 motivations	 constitute	 just	 one	
explanation	 of	 legislative	 organization.	 Models	 suggesting	 the	 electoral	 basis	 of	 legislative	
institutions	are,	or	 at	 least	were,	 a	 central	 tenet	of	 research	on	American	political	 institutions	
and	 political	 development.	 Members’	 electoral	 needs	 also	 appear	 to	 influence	 legislative	
24	
	
organization	 in	 other	 settings.	 Candidate-centered	 electoral	 systems	 (such	 as	 open-list	
proportional	 relationship)	 incentivize	 legislators	 to	 construct	 a	 legislature	 with	 decentralized	
organizational	 structures.	 This	 decentralization	 of	 power	 and	 influence	 permits	 incumbents	 to	
build	personal	 reputations	with	constituents	which	ultimately	aids	 their	 reelection.	 In	contrast,	
party	 entered	electoral	 environments	 (such	as	 closed-list	 proportional	 representation)	 induces	
party-centered	legislatures,	with	the	party	leadership	controlling	the	legislative	agenda	and	using	
legislative	organization	to	shape	the	party	label	and	party	reputation	in	the	electoral	arena.		
	
Yet,	the	empirical	relationship	between	electoral	 incentives	and	legislative	organization	is	not	a	
perfect	one.	For	one	thing,	some	political	systems	have	candidate	centered	elections	but	party-
dominated	legislative	structures	(for	example,	Ireland).	Sieberer	et	al.	(2016)	find	that	changes	to	
standing	 orders	 –	 the	 rules	 dictating	 legislative	 organization	 -	 	 are	 far	 more	 common	 than	
changes	in	electoral	rules	in	Europe,	suggesting	that	electoral	rules	along	can’t	explain	legislative	
reorganization.	 As	 this	 chapter	 has	 discussed,	 the	 uncoupling	 of	 legislative	 organization	 from	
electoral	 institutions	 may	 be	 because	 other	 incentives	 trump	 member’s	 electoral	 incentives.	
Thus,	 parties	 may	 be	 able	 to	 cartelize	 the	 allocation	 of	 prized	 offices	 to	 dull	 the	 effect	 of	
electoral	 rules	 on	 legislators’	 preferences.	 Moreover,	 rules	 governing	 executive-legislative	
relations	may	privilege	 the	executive	 to	 the	degree	 that	decentralized	 legislative	 structures	do	
not	allow	individual	legislators	to	cultivate	personal	votes.	For	example,	committee	work	absent	
the	ability	to	use	committees	to	buy	votes	may	be	of	little	interest	to	legislators,	resulting	in	little	
incentive	to	delegate	decision	making	away	from	the	plenary.		
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Figure 3: Complementary or Competing Impact of the Electoral System and Mega-Seat Allocation System on 
Incentives for Unified Party Voting 
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